

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1002

14 June 1990

ENGLISH

Original: RUSSIAN

LETTER DATED 13 JUNE 1990 FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING THE TEXTS OF A PRESS RELEASE AND A DECLARATION ADOPTED AT THE MEETING OF THE POLITICAL CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE OF THE STATES PARTIES TO THE WARSAW TREATY IN MOSCOW ON 7 JUNE 1990

I have the honour to inform you that a meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty was held on 7 June 1990 in Moscow.

The meeting adopted a press release as well as a declaration by the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty.

As a representative of the country which organized the meeting, and in accordance with established practice, I hereby request you to distribute these papers as official documents of the Conference on Disarmament.

(signed) S. Batsanov
Representative of the USSR to
Conference on Disarmament

Press release on the outcome of the meeting of the
Political Consultative Committee

A meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty was held on 7 June 1990 in Moscow. It was attended by the following:

People's Republic of Bulgaria - Petar Mladenov, President and head of delegation; Andrei Lukanov, Chairman of the Council of Ministers; Dobri Dzhurov, Minister of Defence; and Boiko Dimitrov, Minister for Foreign Affairs;

Republic of Hungary - Jozsef Antall, Prime Minister and head of delegation; Arpad Goncz, interim President; Lajos Für, Minister of Defence, Ferenc Somogyi, Secretary of State in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and Sandor Gjörke, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the USSR;

German Democratic Republic - Lothar de Maizière, Prime Minister and head of delegation; Sabina Bergmann-Pohl, Chairman of the People's Chamber, Markus Meckel, Minister for Foreign Affairs; and Rainer Eppelmann, Minister of Disarmament and Defence;

Republic of Poland - Wojciech Jaruzelski, President and head of delegation; Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Chairman of the Council of Ministers; Krzysztof Skubiszewski, Minister for Foreign Affairs; and Florian Siwicki, Minister of Defence;

Romania - Ion Iliescu, President and head of delegation; Petre Roman, Prime Minister; Victor Stanculescu, Minister of Defence; Romulus Neagu, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs; and Vasile Sandru, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the USSR;

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics - Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev, President and head of delegation; Nikolai Ivanovich Ryzhkov, Chairman of the Council of Ministers; Eduard Ambrosievich Shevardnadze, Minister for Foreign Affairs; Aleksandr Nikolaevich Yakovlev, member of the President's Council; and Dmitri Timofeevich Yazov, Minister of Defence;

Czech and Slovak Federal Republic - Vaclav Havel, President and head of delegation; Marian Calfa, Head of Government; Jiri Dienstbier, Deputy Head of Government and Minister for Foreign Affairs; and Miroslav Vacek, Minister of Defence.

The Secretary-General of the Political Consultative Committee, I.P. Aboimov, and the Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Armed Forces of the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty, Army General P.G. Lushev, also took part in the work of the meeting.

The participants examined the prospects for the CSCE process, the creation of new security structures and the strengthening of stability in Europe.

The participants exchanged views concerning the review of the nature, functions and activities of the Warsaw Treaty, and the possibility of its being fundamentally restructured.

The President of the USSR informed the leaders of the allied Governments of the results of the Soviet-American summit talks held between 30 May and 4 June 1990.

The representative of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs Zdenek Matejka, was appointed as Secretary-General of the Political Consultative Committee for the next term of office.

The participants adopted a declaration by the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty, which is being issued separately.

The meeting was held in a friendly and business-like atmosphere.

The next meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty will be held in Prague.

Declaration by the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty

The high-level representatives of the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty who gathered in Moscow on 7 June 1990 at a meeting of the Political Consultative Committee adopted the following statement.

I.

Current developments in Europe are creating the conditions for overcoming the bloc-based model of security and the division of the continent. These developments are becoming irreversible. They are in line with the interest of peoples in living in harmony, without artificial barriers or ideological enmity. The participants favour the establishment of a new, pan-European security system, and a united Europe of peace and co-operation.

The States which were represented at the meeting are actively participating in this dynamic process, and consequently consider it essential to review the nature and functions of the Warsaw Treaty. They are convinced that only thus can the Warsaw Treaty fulfil, in a period of transition, new urgent tasks related to disarmament and the creation of a pan-European security system.

The States parties to the Warsaw Treaty concur that the ideological image of the enemy has largely been overcome by the convergent efforts of East and West, while the very concepts of East and West are reacquiring purely geographical significance. They consider that danger could emanate only from those threatening the security of countries in any form, including threats of force or the use of force, whoever might be involved. Elements of confrontation contained in documents of the Warsaw Treaty and the North Atlantic Alliance in past years no longer correspond to the spirit of the times.

In this new situation, the Governments which were represented at the meeting are undertaking a review of the nature, functions and activities of the Warsaw Treaty, as well as its transformation into a treaty among sovereign States with equal rights, built upon democratic foundations. For that purpose they have created a temporary commission of government plenipotentiaries which will submit appropriate concrete proposals to the Political Consultative Committee by the end of October 1990. The Committee will examine these proposals before the end of November 1990. In this way the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty wish to contribute to strengthening peace, security and stability in Europe and furthering the Helsinki process.

The participants reaffirmed their readiness to co-operate constructively with the North Atlantic Alliance and its members, and also with the neutral and non-aligned States of the continent, on a bilateral and multilateral basis, in the interest of stability and disarmament in Europe, the strengthening of trust and the consolidation of the principle of defensive sufficiency.

The participants also consider that the consistent and comprehensive institutionalization of the Helsinki process is an important step in this regard. This is the objective of proposals recently made by individual

participants in CSCE. The participants in the meeting expect that the first important decisions on this problem will be adopted at the forthcoming summit meeting of European States, the United States and Canada.

The States parties to the Warsaw Treaty take a positive view of certain concrete steps recently taken by NATO. They expect that the trend towards changes in NATO that has been observed will become more rapid and more thorough-going, and also that it will be reflected in appropriate substantive changes in the Alliance's activities.

II.

The States parties to the Warsaw Treaty expressed their wish for a successful conclusion to the Vienna talks on conventional armed forces and on confidence-building and security-building measures in Europe, in order that agreements on these subjects can be adopted at a meeting of leaders of CSCE participating States at the end of 1990.

Concerning the external aspects of the unification of Germany, a general conviction was expressed that it should be effected in the context of the CSCE process and on the basis of the principles of that process, stimulating and intensifying its development, taking account of the legitimate security interests of Germany's neighbours and all other States, and furnishing firm guarantees of the inviolability of European frontiers.

The States which were represented at the meeting will actively promote the establishment of a European economic and juridical space, as well as the full realization of fundamental human rights and freedoms.

The participants noted that the agreements reached at the meeting between the Presidents of the USSR and the United States are conducive to further progress towards disarmament and the improvement of the international situation.

The States parties to the Warsaw Treaty express their conviction that all States participating in the Helsinki process fully acknowledge their responsibility to ensure that the historic opportunity to create a Europe without blocs and enmity will not be missed.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1003
14 June 1990

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Programme of Work for the Second Part of the 1990 Session of the Conference on Disarmament

(Adopted at the 556th plenary meeting on 14 June 1990)

In compliance with Rule 28 of the Rules of Procedure, the Conference on Disarmament adopts the following programme of work for the second part of its 1990 Session:

- | | |
|------------------|--|
| 12-15 June | Statements in plenary meetings. Consideration of the programme of work, as well as of the establishment of subsidiary bodies on items on the agenda and other organizational questions. |
| 18-29 June | (Nuclear Test Ban.
(
(Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear
(disarmament. |
| 2-6 July | Prevention of an arms race in outer space. |
| 9-13 July | Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters. |
| 16-27 July | Chemical Weapons. |
| 30 July-3 August | (Effective international arrangements to assure
(non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat
(of use of nuclear weapons.
(
(New types of weapons of mass destruction and new
(systems of such weapons; radiological weapons. |
| 6-10 August | Comprehensive programme of disarmament. |
| 13-... | Reports of <u>ad hoc</u> subsidiary bodies, consideration and adoption of the Annual Report to the General Assembly of the United Nations. |

The Conference will continue consideration of its improved and effective functioning and will report to the General Assembly of the United Nations on that subject.

The Conference will further intensify its consultations in pursuance of paragraphs 14 and 15 of its report (CD/956) with a view to taking a positive decision at its 1990 annual session with regard to expansion of its membership by not more than four States and the need to maintain balance in the membership of the Conference and will inform accordingly the forty-fifth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

Meetings of subsidiary bodies will be convened after consultations between the President of the Conference and the Chairmen of the subsidiary bodies, according to the circumstances and needs of those bodies.

The Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events will meet from 30 July to 10 August 1990.

In adopting its programme of work, the Conference has kept in mind the provisions of rules 30 and 31 of its Rules of Procedure.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1004
20 June 1990

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 19 JUNE 1990 FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING JOINT STATEMENTS ON THE TREATY ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AND ON FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS ON NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS AND FURTHER ENHANCING STRATEGIC STABILITY, ADOPTED AT THE UNITED STATES-SOVIET SUMMIT MEETING IN WASHINGTON ON 1 JUNE 1990 */

I have the honour to forward to you the following documents of the United States-Soviet summit meeting in Washington:

- Joint Statement on the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Arms, adopted on 1 June 1990;
- Joint Statement on Future Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms and Further Enhancing Strategic Stability, adopted on 1 June 1990.

In accordance with past practice, Minister S. Batsanov, USSR Representative to the Conference on Disarmament, will transmit these documents in Russian to the Conference on Disarmament.

I ask that you take the appropriate steps to issue these statements as official documents of the Conference on Disarmament and have them distributed to all member delegations and non-member States participating in the work of the Conference.

(Signed) STEPHEN J. LEDOGAR
Representative of the United States of America
to the Conference on Disarmament

*/ The official Russian texts of the documents mentioned herein are to be found in CD/1005.

JOINT STATEMENT ON THE TREATY ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

The President of the United States, George Bush, and the President of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Mikhail S. Gorbachev, discussed the status of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. The two Presidents expressed their satisfaction with the great progress which has been made in the negotiations on this Treaty. In particular, they welcomed the mutually acceptable solutions which have been found on major issues in the talks and reaffirmed their determination to have the Treaty completed and ready for signature by the end of this year. They instructed their negotiating teams in Geneva to accelerate their work to complete the Joint Draft Text recording the details of these solutions in order to fulfil this goal.

The START Treaty will be a major landmark in both arms control and in the relationship between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. It results from the recognition by both sides of the special obligation they bear to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war, enhance strategic stability, and strengthen peace and international security. As such, the START Treaty will signal a turning point in United States-Soviet arms control efforts toward a more rational, open, co-operative, predictable and stable relationship. The Treaty will complement to a remarkable degree the important political changes which have recently begun to remove the hostility and suspicion and will facilitate the reduction of the sizeable stockpiles of strategic offensive arms which now exist.

The benefits of this Treaty are many. For the first time ever, both sides will carry out significant reductions in strategic offensive arms - up to 50 per cent in certain categories. More importantly, these reductions will be designed to make a first strike less plausible. The result will be greater stability and a lower risk of war.

Major agreed provisions of the Treaty are as follows:

The total number of deployed ICBMs and their associated launchers, deployed SLBMs and their associated launchers and heavy bombers will be reduced to no more than 1,600; within this total deployed heavy ICBMs and their associated launchers will be reduced to no more than 154.

The total number of warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs and heavy bombers will be reduced to no more than 6,000. Of these, no more than 4,900 will be warheads on deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs, no more than 1,540 will be warheads on heavy ICBMs, and no more than 1,100 will be warheads on mobile ICBMs;

The aggregate throw-weight of the deployed ICBMs and SLBMs of each side will be limited to an agreed level which will be approximately 50 per cent below the existing level of the aggregate throw-weight of deployed ICBMs and SLBMs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as of a date to be determined. This limit will not be exceeded for the duration of the Treaty;

Heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) will be distinguishable from other heavy bombers. Heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs will be counted as one delivery vehicle against the 1,600 limit and will be attributed with one warhead against the 6,000 limit;

Heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs will be counted as one delivery vehicle against the 1,600 limit and shall be attributed with an agreed number of warheads against the 6,000 limit. Existing and future United States heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs will be attributed with 10 warheads each. Existing and future Soviet heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs will be attributed with 8 warheads each;

Within the 1,600 limit on delivery vehicles the United States of America may have no more than 150 heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs that are attributed with 10 warheads each. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics may exceed that number of heavy bombers by 40 per cent. If the United States of America exceeds the 150 number, each additional heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs will be attributed with the number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which it is actually equipped. If the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics exceeds 210 heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, each such heavy bomber will be attributed with the number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which it is actually equipped;

Existing and future United States heavy bombers may be equipped for no more than 20 long-range nuclear ALCMs; existing and future Soviet heavy bombers may be equipped for no more than 12 long-range nuclear ALCMs;

Long-range ALCMs will be considered those with a range in excess of 600 kilometres. Future long-range non-nuclear ALCMs will not be considered nuclear if they are distinguishable from long-range nuclear ALCMs. There will be no restrictions on deploying such ALCMs on aircraft not limited by the Treaty.

Reductions will be carried out in three phases over a period of seven years. Specific, equal interim levels for agreed categories of strategic offensive arms will be achieved by the end of each phase of reductions;

The numerical limitations provided for by the Treaty will be achieved and complied with through conversion or elimination in accordance with agreed procedures.

Sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) will not be constrained in the START Treaty. Each side will provide the other with a unilateral declaration of its policy concerning nuclear SLCMs and, annually for the duration of the Treaty, with unilateral declarations regarding its planned deployments of nuclear long-range SLCMs, i.e. those with a range in excess of 600 kilometres. Those declarations will be politically binding. In the annual declarations the maximum number of deployed nuclear SLCMs for each of the following five Treaty years will be specified, provided that the number declared will not exceed 880. In the declarations of policy it will be specified that the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will not produce or deploy nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles with multiple independently targetable warheads. The sides reaffirmed their 1987 Washington Summit Joint Statement to continue to seek "mutually acceptable and effective methods of verification".

Except as specifically prohibited, modernization and replacement of strategic offensive arms may be carried out.

The START Treaty will include specific prohibitions on certain categories of strategic offensive arms, basing modes and activities. The following are among the bans under the START Treaty:

- new types of heavy ICBMs;
- heavy SLBMs and launchers of heavy SLBMs;
- mobile launchers of heavy ICBMs;
- new types of ICBMs and SLBMs with more than 10 re-entry vehicles;
- flight testing and deployment of existing types of ICBMs or SLBMs with a number of re-entry vehicles greater than the number specified in the Washington Summit Joint Statement of December 1987;
- rapid reload of ICBM launchers;
- long-range nuclear ALCMs equipped with multiple independently targetable warheads.

The far-reaching reductions and other constraints contained in the Treaty will be accompanied by the most thorough and innovative verification provisions ever negotiated.

Taken together, the START Treaty's comprehensive verification régime will create a degree of transparency in the military sphere which would have been unthinkable only a short time ago. It will not only provide for effective verification of the obligations of the Treaty, but will also greatly increase the mutual confidence which is essential for a sound strategic relationship. In addition, this verification system can provide a model which may be incorporated into future agreements. The verification régime under development includes:

- On-site inspections: For the purpose of ensuring verification of compliance with the Treaty, each side will, on the basis of reciprocity, conduct 12 kinds of on-site inspections, as well as continuous monitoring of mobile ICBM production facilities, in accordance with agreed procedures. Inter alia, each side will conduct short-notice inspections at facilities related to strategic offensive arms, including inspections to verify the numbers of re-entry vehicles on deployed ballistic missiles, inspections to verify elimination of strategic offensive arms and facilities related to them, suspect site inspections, and various exhibitions.
- National technical means of verification: For the purpose of ensuring verification, each side will use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law. The Treaty will include a series of co-operative measures to enhance the effectiveness of national technical means of verification. There will be a ban on interference with such means;
- Ban on denial of telemetric information: The sides agreed to make on-board technical measurements on ICBMs and SLBMs and to broadcast

all telemetric information obtained from such measurements. Except for strictly limited exemptions, there will be a ban on any practice, including the use of encryption, encapsulation or jamming, that denies full access to telemetric information;

- Information exchange: Before signature of the Treaty the sides will exchange data on the numbers, locations and technical characteristics of their strategic offensive arms. These data will be updated on a regular basis throughout the lifetime of the Treaty;
- A comprehensive agreement on the manner of deployment of mobile ICBM launchers and their associated missiles and appropriate limitations on their movements so as to ensure effective verification of adherence to the numerical limitations provided for in the Treaty. In addition, the number of non-deployed ICBMs for mobile launchers will be limited and mobile ICBMs will be subject to identification through the application of unique identifiers, or tags.

To promote the objectives of the Treaty, the sides will establish the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.

The sides have agreed that the Treaty will have a duration of 15 years, unless superseded earlier by a subsequent agreement. If the sides so agree, the Treaty can be extended for successive five-year periods, unless superseded.

The progress outlined above fulfils the aim, set forth by the Presidents of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics during their Malta meeting, of agreeing upon the basic provisions of the strategic offensive arms Treaty by the time of their Washington meeting. The two Presidents express confidence that the Foreign Ministers and the delegations of the two countries at the Geneva talks will be able to reach agreement in the remaining months on the outstanding issues that are still being negotiated.

Joint Statement on Future Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms
and Further Enhancing Strategic Stability

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, building on the results of the current negotiations, agree to pursue new talks on strategic offensive arms, and on the relationship between strategic offensive and defensive arms. The objectives of these negotiations will be to reduce further the risk of outbreak of war, particularly nuclear war, and to ensure strategic stability, transparency and predictability through further stabilizing reductions in the strategic arsenals of both countries. This will be achieved by seeking agreements that improve survivability, remove incentives for a nuclear first strike and implement an appropriate relationship between strategic offenses and defenses.

In order to attain these objectives, the sides have agreed as follows:

First. This year the sides will complete work on the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. Following the signing of the Treaty, the sides will hold consultations without delay regarding future talks and these important talks will begin at the earliest practical date. Both sides in these future talks will be free to raise any issues related to any strategic offensive arms.

Within the existing negotiating framework on Nuclear and Space Arms in Geneva, the two sides will continue negotiations on ABM and space without delay.

Thus, in the future talks the two sides will discuss strategic stability issues of interest to them, including the relationship between strategic offensive and defensive arms, taking into account stabilizing reductions in strategic offensive arms and development of new technologies. The sides will work toward the important goal of reaching an early outcome in these negotiations.

Second. The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, as is the case in the emerging START Treaty, will, in the new negotiations, seek to reduce their strategic offensive arms in a way consistent with enhancing strategic stability. In the new negotiations, the two sides agree to place emphasis on removing incentives for a nuclear first strike, on reducing the concentration of warheads on strategic delivery vehicles, and on giving priority to highly survivable systems.

In particular, the two sides will seek measures that reduce the concentration of warheads on strategic delivery vehicles as a whole, including measures related to the question of heavy missiles and MIRVed ICBMs. Effective verification will be provided by national technical means, co-operative measures, and on-site inspection.

Third. Having agreed on the need to ensure a predictable strategic relationship between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the sides will, for the entire duration of the START Treaty, exchange, at the beginning of each calendar year, information on planned changes in the numbers of strategic offensive arms as of the end of the current year.

Fourth. The sides will pursue additional measures to build confidence and ensure predictability of the military activities of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics that would reduce the possibility of an outbreak of nuclear war as a result of accident, miscalculation, terrorism, or unexpected technological breakthrough, and would prevent possible incidents between them.

Fifth. The sides believe that reducing the risk of outbreak of nuclear war is the responsibility not only of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and that other States should also make their contribution toward the attainment of this objective, in particular in the field of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. They call upon all States to consider the new opportunities for engagement in mankind's common effort to remove the risk of outbreak of nuclear war worldwide.

Accordingly, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will give these future negotiations the highest priority so that the benefits of strengthened stability can be realized as soon as possible.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1005
20 June 1990

ENGLISH
Original: RUSSIAN

LETTER DATED 19 JUNE 1990 FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ADDRESSED TO THE
PRESIDENT OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING
JOINT STATEMENTS ON THE TREATY ON STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE
ARMS AND ON FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS ON NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS
AND FURTHER ENHANCING STRATEGIC STABILITY, ADOPTED AT
THE SOVIET-UNITED STATES SUMMIT MEETING IN WASHINGTON - 4
ON 1 JUNE 1990 */

I have the honour to forward to you the following documents of the
Soviet-United States summit meeting in Washington:

- Joint Statement on the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Arms, adopted in
Washington on 1 June 1990;
- Joint Statement on Future Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms and
Further Enhancing Strategic Stability, adopted in Washington on
1 June 1990.

In accordance with past practice, Ambassador S. Ledogar, Representative
of the United States of America to the Conference on Disarmament, will
transmit these documents in English to the Conference on Disarmament.

I ask that you take the appropriate steps to issue these documents as
official documents of the Conference on Disarmament and to distribute them to
the delegations of all States members of the Conference and States non-members
of the Conference participating in the work of the Conference.

REPRESENTATIVE OF THE USSR
TO THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

(Signed) S. BATSANOV

*/ The official English texts of the documents mentioned herein are to
be found in CD/1004.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1006

20 June 1990

ENGLISH

Original: ENGLISH/FRENCH

LETTER DATED 19 JUNE 1990 FROM THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE
UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND ADDRESSED
TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT
TRANSMITTING A DOCUMENT ADOPTED AT THE MINISTERIAL MEETING OF
THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL AT TURNBERRY, UNITED KINGDOM,
ON 7 AND 8 JUNE 1990

On behalf of those States which belong to the North Atlantic Alliance and
are members of the Conference on Disarmament, I have the honour to forward to
you the following document:

"Message from Turnberry, and Final Communiqué from the Ministerial
Meeting of the North Atlantic Council at Turnberry, United Kingdom, on
7 and 8 June 1990".

The document is attached in the official English and French versions. I
should be grateful if you would circulate, as an official document of the
Conference on Disarmament, this letter together with the document adopted by
the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in its English and
French versions.

(Signed)

T.A.H. Solesby
Ambassador

N A T O ————  ———— O T A N

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PRESS COMMUNIQUÉ M-1(90)29

For immediate release
8 June 1990

MINISTERIAL MEETING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL
AT TURNBERRY, UNITED KINGDOM
7th-8th June 1990

MESSAGE FROM TURNBERRY

We, the Foreign Ministers of the Alliance, express our determination to seize the historic opportunities resulting from the profound changes in Europe to help build a new peaceful order in Europe, based on freedom, justice and democracy. In this spirit, we extend to the Soviet Union and to all other European countries the hand of friendship and co-operation.

True and enduring security in Europe will be best assured through mutual acknowledgement and understanding of the legitimate security interests of all states. We are ready to contribute actively to building confidence and closer relations between all European countries, including the members of the two alliances. We welcome the statement issued by the members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization in Moscow on 7th June. We are encouraged by the positive spirit conveyed in this declaration and in particular by the readiness on the part of the countries issuing it for constructive co-operation.

The CSCE process, which will become even more important as an instrument for co-operation and security in Europe, should be strengthened and given effective institutional form. We are committed to work for a rapid and successful conclusion of the Vienna negotiations on conventional forces. The arms control process must be vigorously pursued.

We are convinced that German unification is a major contribution to stability in Europe.

Recognising the eminently political importance of these tasks, we are ready to do our utmost for their accomplishment.

* * *

FINAL COMMUNIQUÉ

1. The historic events that have occurred since we met last December in Brussels confirm that Europe is entering a new era. The countries of Central and Eastern Europe are taking steps to establish democratic institutions, hold free elections and

promote political pluralism and market-oriented economic policies. Germany is peacefully and democratically moving towards unity. We welcome the expansion and deepening of political exchanges at all levels. The visits to NATO by the Soviet, Czechoslovak and Polish Foreign Ministers exemplify this broadened dialogue. We look to further such opportunities in the future. A continent divided for four decades is searching for new patterns and structures of co-operation. These positive trends are having repercussions beyond Europe: democracy, the search for peaceful solutions and respect for human values are gaining ground in other parts of the world as well. Our Alliance remains vitally important as an instrument both for ensuring the security of its members and the stability of Europe and as a keystone of our efforts to build a new European order of peace. At this meeting, we have looked ahead to both continuing and new Alliance tasks in support of the positive changes in Europe, in preparation for the decisions to be taken by our Heads of State and Government next month in London. To that end, we have confirmed our agreement on the following points.

2. We strongly emphasise that we attach the highest priority to the conclusion this year of a CFE treaty. This must encompass all subjects under negotiation, and result in substantial, binding, verifiable reductions of conventional forces in Europe, thus eliminating destabilising disparities and the capability to launch a surprise attack or initiate large-scale offensive action. Such a treaty would be a dramatic advance towards greater stability and security in Europe. That goal is within sight, and it is now imperative that the remaining obstacles to its achievement be removed. We remain ready to take account of the stated interests of the other participants and to explore all open issues on the basis of a willingness on all sides to make reasonable compromises. We have therefore instructed our negotiators in Vienna to pursue new approaches to mutually acceptable solutions, in particular on aircraft, armour and verification. We call on the Soviet Union to co-operate in reaching agreement on all substantive issues this Summer, in order that progress can be made on the broader agenda for the construction of a new Europe, including a CSCE Summit later this year.

3. Allied governments will continue to work for substantive results in the CSBM negotiations, in the form of an agreement later this year. To that end, Allies have recently proposed a series of innovative co-operative measures, such as a mechanism for discussion of unusual activities of a military nature and annual implementation assessment meetings. We will continue to build on the contributions to confidence-building flowing from the Military Doctrine Seminar held in January in the framework of the CSBM negotiations in order to further expand military contacts and exchanges on military matters.

4. As soon as a CFE agreement is reached, Allies will be prepared to undertake follow-on negotiations to further enhance security and stability in Europe. The objectives of these follow-on negotiations, and of our further quest for European security, including through conventional arms control, will be considered at our meeting of Heads of State and Government.

5. We welcome the progress attained in the US-Soviet Summit held last week and, in particular, the agreement on major outstanding issues governing a START treaty that will result in deep reductions in both sides' strategic nuclear weapons and greatly expand bilateral military transparency in that area, as well as agreement to begin further talks on strategic nuclear forces specifically devoted to achieving a more stable strategic balance after the current treaty is completed. We took special note of the progress represented by the signature at the Summit meeting of verification protocols for treaties limiting nuclear testing and expressed our satisfaction with the bilateral agreement that will drastically reduce both sides' stocks of chemical weapons.

6. We believe the US-Soviet agreement on reducing chemical weapons stockpiles will provide great impetus towards the earliest possible conclusion of the convention for an effectively verifiable, global and comprehensive ban on chemical weapons now being negotiated, which remains our goal. All Allies hereby state their intention to be among the original signatories to the convention and to promote its early entry into force. We call on all other states to undertake a similar commitment. We reaffirm our determination to work to prevent the proliferation of nuclear and chemical weapons and of missiles capable of carrying such weapons.

7. We will pursue the "Open Skies" initiative, convinced that such a regime would make a significant contribution to the openness and transparency we wish to encourage. We therefore regret that our efforts to reach such an agreement have thus far not been successful and look to the Soviet Union to join with us to take the steps necessary to create an "Open Skies" regime that will increase calculability, mutual confidence and the security of all participants.

8. Recognising that the verification of arms control treaties is destined to become a long-term task for the Alliance, we have decided to establish a co-ordination mechanism for this purpose.

9. We agree on the crucial importance of the political and economic reforms underway in the states of Central and Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. The continued progress of these states towards becoming democratic and economically prosperous partners co-operating with us will be an important element in the future security and stability of Europe. We are prepared to support their efforts to integrate their economies more closely into the world economy and to widen and deepen the scope of our co-operation with them as they progress, thus contributing to the success of their reform programmes.

10. We strongly hope that the processes of economic re-orientation and development and of democratic institution-building in these countries, necessarily complicated and uneven, will successfully overcome periods of uncertainty and potential instability. The historic changes already underway and the prospects for further positive developments have not removed all grounds for concern about the stability and security of Europe. Moreover, we cannot be oblivious to the fact that the Soviet Union will retain substantial military capabilities, which it is

continuing to modernise and which have implications for our defence.

11. The need to maintain our common defence remains vital. The Alliance's role of preventing conflict, precluding the use or threat of force against any of its members and guaranteeing stability will continue to be essential. That role is built upon the principle of the indivisibility of security for all member countries and embodies an indispensable link between North America and European democracies. For the foreseeable future, the prevention of war will continue to require an appropriate mix of survivable and effective conventional and nuclear forces, at the lowest levels consistent with our security needs. Our resolve, our commitment to the equitable and widespread sharing of responsibilities, and our solidarity with which we have maintained adequate collective defence arrangements for so long, including the presence of significant North American conventional and nuclear forces in Europe, will continue to be crucial factors in the maintenance of peace in Europe.

12. The military risks facing the Alliance have already decreased substantially, and implementation of a successful CFE agreement would result in a further dramatic improvement. The principles of Alliance security set out in May 1989 in the Comprehensive Concept of Arms Control and Disarmament are the basis for our further work in assessing the implications of the changing situation in Europe for our strategy. Thus, those governments among us participating in the Defence Planning Committee welcome its recent decision to undertake a review of NATO's military strategy, and the means of implementing it, in the emerging circumstances. They also welcome the invitation to the NATO Military Authorities to undertake a study of the possibilities of greater use of multi-national forces. They endorse the US President's recent proposal that negotiations on US and Soviet short-range nuclear weapon systems in Europe begin shortly after a CFE agreement is concluded.

13. We see the CSCE process as an important framework for far-reaching reforms and stability and as a central element in the construction of a new Europe, along with other European institutions including the Alliance itself. The function of the CSCE will be complementary to that of the Alliance. The CSCE, having from the outset served to ease the burden of the division of Europe, will now become even more vital as an instrument for developing structures for a Europe whole and free and for co-operation within a united continent. The Allies look forward to an early outcome to the CFE negotiations which are taking place in the CSCE framework and to continued progress in the talks on confidence and security-building measures, which, along with results of CSCE inter-sessional activities, will lay the necessary basis for the CSCE Summit this year. The Summit should reflect the new role of the CSCE and take appropriate decisions. Furthermore, it is the hope of the Allies that the "2 + 4" process will be completed prior to the CSCE Summit. That Summit will help consolidate the changes that have taken place in Central and Eastern Europe, and provide substantial new impetus to the CSCE process in all main areas of the Helsinki Final Act. To this end, implementation in letter and spirit of all CSCE

obligations by all CSCE participating states remains essential. Meanwhile, we believe that the time has now come to determine the modalities of institutionalisation without depriving the process of its flexibility and balance. A number of valuable proposals have been raised within the framework of Alliance consultations for the further development of the CSCE process and for enhancing regional co-operation efforts. They include a consultation mechanism on a high level as well as other arrangements in specific fields of co-operation. Our governments continue to develop these ideas as our preparations continue for the CSCE Summit. We are pleased that other CSCE participants are equally developing their ideas. We welcome the decision of the Foreign Ministers of the 35 CSCE states at their meeting in Copenhagen on 5th June 1990 to establish a preparatory Committee for the Summit, and for Ministers of the "35" to meet in the United States this Autumn.

14. Welcoming agreement at the recent Bonn Conference on Economic Co-operation in Europe on fundamental principles to guide the conversion from planned to market-oriented economies, we fully support the efforts of the Copenhagen meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension now underway to reinforce and extend the protection and guarantee of human rights and individual freedoms. Allies place particular importance on resolutions concerning the right to free and fair elections held at regular intervals, a commitment to the rule of law, and rights of persons belonging to national minorities among many proposals put forward for consideration at the Copenhagen meeting. We hope that the Palma de Mallorca meeting on the Mediterranean will contribute to enhancing co-operation also in that region. We also welcome the interest recently expressed by the Albanian Government in associating itself with the CSCE process and the commitments therein. We look to the Albanian Government to demonstrate its willingness to comply with all existing CSCE commitments, including those on human rights.

15. We note with pride that after 40 years as a divided city, Berlin is finally growing together again. The Berlin Wall has come down. This heralds the long-awaited ending of the post-war era and of the division of Germany and of Europe. The realisation of the unity of Germany has always been a primary goal of our Alliance. Therefore, on the basis of our close and continuing consultations within the Alliance, we are united in actively supporting the process that has already been achieved in the process of German unification; we also support the efforts underway in the "2 + 4" talks to seek a final settlement under international law terminating the Four Power rights and responsibilities relating to Berlin and Germany as a whole, and without the establishment of constraints on the sovereignty of Germany. A united Germany must have the right, recognised in the Helsinki Final Act, to choose to be a party to a treaty of alliance. We believe that European stability, as well as the wishes of the German people, requires that a unified Germany be a full member of this Alliance, including its integrated military structure, without prejudice to stated positions about nondeployment of NATO forces on the present GDR territory. The security guarantee provided by Articles 5 and 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty will extend to all the territory of a united

Germany. We seek no unilateral advantage from German unity and are prepared to demonstrate this, taking into account legitimate Soviet security interests. A free and democratic Germany will be an essential element of a peaceful order in Europe in which no state need harbour fears for its security against its neighbours. We underline the importance of the points on German unification discussed with the Soviet leadership in Washington, which fully reflect our consultations.

16. We express the wish that the problems accompanying the difficult internal transition of the Soviet Union be solved in a constructive manner and to the satisfaction of all concerned. In this context, we firmly support the expectations and aspirations of the Baltic peoples. It is our understanding that the leaders of Lithuania and the Soviet Union have indicated their willingness to begin a dialogue upon the suspension - and not retraction - by the Lithuanian leadership of the implementation of their declaration of independence. We appeal to all parties to show flexibility and enter into true dialogue to reach an early solution.

17. Our activities in the scientific and environmental fields, known as NATO's "Third Dimension", remain of major benefit to our member nations and are an expression of their solidarity. In the spirit of the 40th Anniversary Summit Declaration, we shall pursue measures to invite scientific experts from Central and Eastern Europe to participate in work on the environment connected with pilot studies within the framework of the Committee on the Challenges on Modern Society.

18. The NATO Summit in May 1989 launched a Democratic Institutions Fellowship programme intended to help qualified applicants from Central and Eastern Europe, as well as those from Alliance countries, to study our democratic values and way of life. We intend to pursue this initiative and are pleased with the strong response it has received in its first year.

19. Mindful of the continuing need to inform our publics better about the work and objectives of the Alliance, we expressed our strong support for the network of Atlantic Committees and Associations brought together under the Atlantic Treaty Association. We are convinced that they have a vital role to play in deepening public understanding of the role of the Alliance. We underline the great value of the exchanges of views in the North Atlantic Assembly on issues facing the Alliance.

20. The developments which we are now witnessing and of which we have been and will continue to be among the principal architects, are producing far-reaching changes in the political and military fundamentals of European security, and consequently in the conditions under which our Alliance is required to work.

These changes call into question neither the necessity for maintaining the Alliance nor the permanence of its fundamental features. We will keep our Alliance dynamic and cohesive and will continue to foster a solid and fruitful transatlantic relationship between North America and an increasingly united Europe. We will remain cognisant of the need for intra-Alliance

co-operation and assistance. We must continue, in the face of historic change, to deepen and strengthen our political consultation and, where appropriate, co-ordination.

Thus, while ensuring that the permanent principles which form the basis of our Alliance and guarantee its effectiveness are preserved, we must today adapt it to the enormous changes now taking place.

We have already begun this process in the political and defence spheres, as demonstrated by our Ministerial consultations this Spring. We have shown ourselves ready, through the arms control negotiations in which we are participating or which we are preparing to initiate, to adjust the size of the Allies' conventional and nuclear forces. We have noted that the Defence Ministers who participate in the Nuclear Planning Group and the Defence Planning Committee have decided to reconsider their strategy. Although the prevention of war will always remain our fundamental task, the changing European environment now requires of us a broader approach to security based as much on constructive peace-building as on peace-keeping.

21. We recognise, against the background of the changes now taking place in Europe, that the modifications in certain aspects of the Alliance's policies and functioning will form part of a broader pattern of adaptation within the Organization. This process should encompass all activities of our Alliance and must be consistent with the principles which we have declared to be permanent and with the requirements of the new era upon which we are embarking. We have, therefore, instructed our Council in Permanent Session to oversee the work in hand, with a view to ensuring that it is effectively co-ordinated, and to report regularly to us on the progress made.

22. We express our deep appreciation for the warm hospitality provided by the Government of the United Kingdom.

N A T O ———— O T A N

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REUNION DU CONSEIL DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD EN SESSION MINISTÉRIELLE
A TURNBERRY, ROYAUME-UNI
7 ET 8 JUIN 1990

MESSAGE DE TURNBERRY

Nous, Ministres des affaires étrangères des pays membres de l'Alliance, exprimons notre détermination à saisir les occasions historiques qui découlent des profonds changements intervenus en Europe et à contribuer ainsi à l'instauration d'un nouvel ordre pacifique en Europe fondé sur la liberté, la justice et la démocratie. Dans cet esprit, nous adressons à l'Union soviétique et à tous les autres pays européens un message d'amitié et de coopération.

Le meilleur moyen d'assurer à l'Europe une sécurité véritable et durable est de faire en sorte que les intérêts légitimes de tous les Etats en matière de sécurité soient mutuellement compris et reconnus. Nous sommes prêts à contribuer activement à l'édification et au resserrement de relations de confiance entre tous les pays européens, y compris entre les membres des deux Alliances. Nous accueillons avec satisfaction la déclaration faite par les membres de l'Organisation du Traité de Varsovie à Moscou le 7 juin. Nous jugeons encourageante la tonalité positive de cette déclaration, et notamment la volonté de coopération constructive manifestée par les pays qui l'ont publiée.

Le processus de la CSCE, qui revêtira une importance encore plus grande comme instrument de coopération et de sécurité en Europe, devrait être renforcé et faire l'objet d'une forme d'institutionnalisation. Nous sommes attachés à oeuvrer en faveur de la conclusion rapide et satisfaisante des négociations de Vienne sur les forces conventionnelles. Le processus de maîtrise des armements doit être poursuivi avec vigueur.

Nous sommes convaincus que l'unification allemande apporte une contribution majeure à la stabilité en Europe.

Reconnaissant l'importance éminemment politique de ces tâches, nous sommes prêts à tout mettre en oeuvre pour les mener à bien.

* * *

COMMUNIQUE FINAL

1. Les événements historiques survenus depuis la réunion que nous avons tenue en décembre de l'année dernière, à Bruxelles, confirment que l'Europe se trouve à l'aube d'une ère nouvelle. Les pays d'Europe centrale et orientale sont en train de franchir des étapes décisives vers la mise en place d'institutions démocratiques, la tenue d'élections libres et le développement du pluralisme

politique et de systèmes économiques orientés par les lois du marché. L'Allemagne s'achemine, pacifiquement et démocratiquement, vers l'unité. Nous nous félicitons de ce que les échanges politiques se multiplient et s'intensifient à tous les niveaux. Les visites que les Ministres des affaires étrangères d'Union soviétique, de Tchécoslovaquie et de Pologne ont effectuées au siège de l'OTAN sont autant d'exemples de ce dialogue élargi. Nous espérons que cette évolution favorable se poursuivra à l'avenir. Un continent divisé depuis quarante ans s'efforce de trouver de nouveaux schémas et de nouvelles structures de coopération. Ces tendances positives ont des répercussions qui dépassent le cadre de l'Europe : la démocratie, la recherche de solutions pacifiques et le respect des valeurs humaines gagnent du terrain dans d'autres parties du monde également. Notre Alliance conserve une importance vitale comme instrument propre à garantir la sécurité de ses membres en même temps que la stabilité de l'Europe, et comme élément clé de nos efforts pour construire un nouvel ordre de paix en Europe. A la présente réunion, nous avons envisagé les tâches que l'Alliance devra poursuivre et entreprendre en faveur des changements positifs en Europe pour préparer les décisions que prendront le mois prochain, à Londres, les Chefs d'Etat et de gouvernement de nos pays. A cette fin, nous avons confirmé notre accord sur les points suivants.

2. Nous rappelons avec vigueur que nous accordons la priorité la plus élevée à la signature, dans l'année, d'un traité sur les FCE. Celui-ci devra porter sur l'ensemble des questions faisant l'objet de négociations et conduire à des réductions substantielles, contraignantes et vérifiables, des armes conventionnelles en Europe, éliminant ainsi des déséquilibres, facteurs d'instabilité, et la capacité de lancer des attaques par surprise ou de mener des opérations offensives de grande envergure. Un tel traité représenterait un progrès majeur vers le renforcement de la stabilité et de la sécurité en Europe. Cet objectif est en vue, et il est maintenant impératif de surmonter les derniers obstacles qui subsistent sur la voie de sa réalisation. Nous restons prêts à tenir compte des intérêts que les autres participants font valoir et à examiner toutes les questions en suspens avec, de part et d'autre, la volonté de parvenir à des compromis raisonnables. C'est pourquoi nous avons chargé nos négociateurs à Vienne de définir des approches nouvelles pour arriver à des solutions mutuellement acceptables en ce qui concerne particulièrement les avions, les blindés et la vérification. Nous appelons l'Union soviétique à coopérer en vue de la conclusion, cet été, d'un accord sur toutes les questions fondamentales afin que des progrès puissent s'accomplir vers la mise en oeuvre de l'objectif plus général de l'édification d'une Europe nouvelle, avec notamment l'organisation d'un Sommet de la CSCE avant la fin de cette année.

3. Les gouvernements des pays alliés continueront d'oeuvrer pour obtenir, aux négociations sur les MDCS, des résultats substantiels sous la forme d'un accord d'ici la fin de l'année. A cet effet, les Alliés ont récemment proposé une série de mesures nouvelles privilégiant la coopération, telles que l'adoption d'un mécanisme d'examen des activités militaires inhabituelles et l'organisation de réunions annuelles consacrées à l'évaluation de la mise en oeuvre. Afin de développer encore les contacts et les échanges dans le domaine militaire, nous continuerons de tirer tout le parti possible des contributions que le Séminaire sur les doctrines militaires, tenu en janvier dans le cadre des négociations sur les MDCS, a apportées au renforcement de la confiance.

4. Dès la conclusion d'un accord sur les FCE, les Alliés seront prêts à engager d'autres négociations pour renforcer la sécurité et la stabilité en Europe. Les objectifs de ces autres négociations et des efforts que nous continuerons de déployer en faveur de la sécurité européenne, notamment par la maîtrise des armements conventionnels, feront l'objet d'un examen à la réunion des Chefs d'Etat et de gouvernement de nos pays.

5. Nous accueillons avec satisfaction les progrès enregistrés lors du Sommet américano-soviétique de la semaine dernière, et notamment l'accord sur les grandes questions en suspens qui conditionnent la signature d'un traité START devant conduire à d'importantes réductions des armes nucléaires stratégiques des deux parties, à un accroissement considérable de la transparence militaire bilatérale dans ce domaine, ainsi qu'à la décision d'entamer une nouvelle série de pourparlers sur les forces nucléaires stratégiques dont l'objet sera, plus particulièrement, de parvenir à un équilibre stratégique plus stable après la conclusion du traité actuel. Nous prenons bonne note du progrès que représente la signature, à l'occasion de ce Sommet, de protocoles de vérification de traités visant à limiter les essais nucléaires et nous nous félicitons de l'accord bilatéral qui entraînera une réduction radicale des stocks d'armes chimiques des deux parties.

6. Nous considérons que l'accord américano-soviétique sur la réduction des stocks d'armes chimiques donnera un grand élan aux travaux visant à la conclusion, dans les plus brefs délais possible, de la convention sur l'interdiction universelle, globale et effectivement vérifiable des armes chimiques, convention dont la négociation se poursuit et qui demeure notre objectif. Tous les Alliés proclament leur intention de figurer au nombre de ses signataires originaires et de favoriser son entrée en vigueur à une date rapprochée. Nous appelons tous les autres Etats à prendre un engagement similaire. Nous réaffirmons notre détermination à lutter contre la prolifération des armes nucléaires et chimiques ainsi que des missiles pouvant servir de vecteurs à de telles armes.

7. Nous donnerons suite à l'initiative concernant un régime "Ciel ouvert", car nous sommes convaincus qu'il contribuerait grandement à l'ouverture et à la transparence que nous souhaitons encourager. Nous regrettons par conséquent que nos efforts pour parvenir à un tel accord n'aient pas encore abouti et nous attendons de l'Union soviétique qu'elle se joigne à nous, afin de prendre les mesures nécessaires à l'établissement d'un régime propre à accroître la prévisibilité, la confiance mutuelle et la sécurité de tous les participants.

8. Consciente que la vérification de traités sur la maîtrise des armements est appelée à devenir une tâche à long terme de l'Alliance, nous avons décidé de mettre en place un mécanisme de coordination à cet effet.

9. Nous considérons que les réformes politiques et économiques en cours dans les Etats d'Europe centrale et orientale et en Union soviétique revêtent une importance cruciale. Les progrès qu'ils continueront d'accomplir sur la voie de la démocratie et de la prospérité économique, pour devenir les partenaires de nos pays, constitueront un facteur important pour la sécurité et la stabilité de l'Europe. Nous sommes prêts à soutenir les efforts qu'ils déploient pour

intégrer plus étroitement leurs systèmes économiques à l'économie mondiale, ainsi qu'à élargir et à intensifier notre coopération avec eux en fonction de leurs progrès, et à contribuer de la sorte au succès de leurs programmes de réformes.

10. Nous espérons vivement que la restructuration et le développement économiques, ainsi que la mise en place d'institutions démocratiques dans ces pays - processus forcément complexes et délicats - permettront de mettre fin aux périodes d'incertitude et aux instabilités potentielles. Les changements historiques déjà en cours et la perspective d'autres développements positifs n'ont pas effacé toutes les causes de préoccupation quant à la stabilité et à la sécurité en Europe. Par ailleurs, nous ne saurions méconnaître le fait que l'Union soviétique conservera des capacités militaires substantielles dont elle poursuit la modernisation, ce qui a des implications pour notre défense.

11. La nécessité de maintenir notre défense commune demeure vitale. L'Alliance continuera de jouer un rôle essentiel pour prévenir les conflits, pour empêcher de recourir à l'emploi ou à la menace de la force contre l'un ou l'autre de ses membres et pour garantir la stabilité. Ce rôle se fonde sur le principe de l'indivisibilité de la sécurité de tous les pays membres, et concrétise le lien indispensable entre les démocraties nord-américaines et européennes. Dans un avenir prévisible, la prévention de la guerre exigera encore une combinaison appropriée de forces efficaces et aptes à la survie, conventionnelles comme nucléaires, au niveau compatible avec les besoins de sécurité de nos pays. Notre résolution, notre volonté d'assurer un partage large et équitable des responsabilités et la solidarité dont nous faisons preuve depuis si longtemps pour préserver des arrangements appropriés de défense collective, avec notamment la présence en Europe d'importantes forces nord-américaines, conventionnelles comme nucléaires, resteront des facteurs cruciaux pour le maintien de la paix sur ce continent.

12. Les risques auxquels l'Alliance est exposée dans le domaine militaire se sont déjà sensiblement atténués, et la mise en oeuvre d'un accord satisfaisant sur les FCE se traduirait par une nouvelle amélioration spectaculaire. Les principes régissant la sécurité de l'Alliance, exposés en mai 1989 dans le Concept global de maîtrise des armements et de désarmement, sont la base de notre évaluation future des conséquences que l'évolution de la situation en Europe peut avoir sur notre stratégie. Ainsi, les gouvernements des pays qui participent aux réunions du Comité des plans de défense accueillent avec satisfaction la décision qu'il a prise, récemment, d'entreprendre une révision de la stratégie militaire de l'OTAN, et des moyens de la mettre en oeuvre, en tenant compte de la situation nouvelle qui se fait jour. Ils se félicitent également de ce que les autorités militaires de l'OTAN aient été invitées à examiner les possibilités d'un recours accru aux forces multinationales. Ils souscrivent à la proposition formulée, il y a peu, par le président Bush, selon laquelle des négociations sur les systèmes de missiles nucléaires à courte portée des Etats-Unis et de l'Union soviétique en Europe devraient commencer peu après la conclusion d'un accord sur les FCE.

13. Le processus de la CSCE constitue à nos yeux un cadre important pour de vastes réformes et pour la stabilité, ainsi qu'un élément central dans la

construction d'une Europe nouvelle, aux côtés d'autres institutions européennes comme de l'Alliance elle-même. La mission de la CSCE sera complémentaire à celle de l'Alliance atlantique. La CSCE, qui sert depuis le début à atténuer les pénibles effets de la division de l'Europe, va désormais jouer un rôle encore plus vital, en tant que moyen d'établir des structures pour une Europe entière et libre et pour une coopération dans un continent uni. Les Alliés souhaitent que les négociations sur les FCE, qui se tiennent dans le cadre de la CSCE, aboutissent rapidement et que celles qui sont consacrées aux mesures de confiance et de sécurité continuent de progresser. Ces négociations constitueront, avec les résultats des activités intersessionnelles menées au titre de la CSCE, l'assise nécessaire du Sommet de cette année. Celui-ci devrait traduire le nouveau rôle de cette instance et permettre de prendre les décisions appropriées. Par ailleurs, les Alliés espèrent que les pourparlers "2+4" auront abouti avant le Sommet de la CSCE. Ce dernier contribuera à consolider les changements survenus en Europe centrale et orientale, et imprimera un nouvel élan important au processus de la CSCE dans tous les principaux domaines couverts par l'Acte final d'Helsinki. A cette fin, la mise en oeuvre, dans la lettre et dans l'esprit, de toutes les obligations au titre de la CSCE par tous les Etats participant à la CSCE demeure essentielle. Nous considérons, en même temps, que le moment est venu de déterminer les modalités d'institutionnalisation, sans nuire pour autant à la souplesse du processus ni à son équilibre. Un certain nombre de propositions intéressantes ont été avancées, dans le cadre des consultations au sein de l'Alliance, concernant l'évolution du processus de la CSCE et l'intensification des efforts de coopération au niveau régional. Elles comportent un mécanisme de consultation à un niveau élevé, ainsi que d'autres dispositions dans certains domaines spécifiques de coopération. Les gouvernements de nos pays continuent de réfléchir à ces idées, alors que se poursuivent nos préparatifs en vue du Sommet de la CSCE. Nous constatons avec plaisir que d'autres participants à cette Conférence ont également engagé un travail de réflexion dans ce sens. Nous accueillons avec satisfaction la décision que les Ministres des affaires étrangères des trente-cinq Etats participant à la CSCE ont prise, à la réunion tenue à Copenhague le 5 juin 1990, d'établir un Comité préparatoire pour le Sommet et de se réunir à l'automne aux Etats-Unis.

14. Nous nous félicitons de l'accord conclu, à la récente Conférence de Bonn sur la coopération économique en Europe, sur les principes fondamentaux qui doivent guider le passage de l'économie planifiée à l'économie de marché, et nous soutenons sans réserve les efforts déployés à la réunion qui se tient à Copenhague dans le cadre de la Conférence sur la dimension humaine, en vue de renforcer la protection et le respect des droits de l'homme et des libertés individuelles. Parmi les nombreuses propositions soumises pour examen à la réunion de Copenhague, les Alliés accordent une importance particulière aux résolutions concernant le droit à des élections libres et justes à des intervalles réguliers, le respect de l'Etat de droit et des droits des personnes appartenant à des minorités nationales. Nous espérons que la réunion de Palma de Majorque sur la Méditerranée contribuera à renforcer la coopération dans cette région également. Nous notons aussi avec satisfaction que le gouvernement albanais a marqué récemment sa volonté de s'associer au processus de la CSCE et de souscrire aux engagements qui en découlent. Nous attendons de ce gouvernement qu'il se montre prêt à se conformer à tous les engagements existants au titre de la CSCE, notamment dans le domaine des droits de l'homme.

15. Nous constatons avec fierté que Berlin, après quarante années de division s'engage enfin sur la voie de l'unité. Le mur de Berlin est tombé. Cette évolution annonce la fin, tant attendue, de la période de l'après-guerre et de la division de l'Allemagne et de l'Europe. L'unité de l'Allemagne a toujours été l'un des objectifs primordiaux de l'Alliance. C'est pourquoi, nous fondant sur les consultations étroites que nous poursuivons au sein de l'OTAN, nous nous réjouissons tous vivement des progrès déjà accomplis sur la voie de l'unification de ce pays; nous apportons également notre appui aux efforts en cours, dans le cadre des pourparlers "2+4", pour parvenir à un règlement définitif de droit international mettant fin aux droits et aux responsabilités des Quatre Puissances concernant Berlin et l'Allemagne dans son ensemble, sans qu'aucune limitation ne soit imposée à la souveraineté de ce pays. Une Allemagne unifiée doit avoir le droit - reconnu dans l'Acte final d'Helsinki - de décider d'être ou non partie à un traité d'alliance. Il importe selon nous, pour assurer la stabilité de l'Europe et répondre aux vœux exprimés par le peuple allemand, que l'Allemagne unifiée soit membre à part entière de l'Alliance et de sa structure militaire intégrée, sans préjudice des prises de position concernant le non-déploiement de forces de l'OTAN sur le territoire actuel de l'Allemagne de l'Est. Les garanties de sécurité prévues aux termes des Articles 5 et 6 du Traité de l'Atlantique Nord s'étendront à l'ensemble du territoire de l'Allemagne unifiée. Nous ne cherchons à retirer aucun avantage unilatéral de l'unité allemande et nous sommes prêts à le prouver, en tenant compte des intérêts légitimes de l'Union soviétique en matière de sécurité. Une Allemagne libre et démocratique sera un élément essentiel d'un ordre pacifique en Europe dans lequel aucun Etat ne devra craindre de voir sa sécurité mise en cause par ses voisins. Nous soulignons l'importance des points relatifs à l'unification allemande qui ont été débattus avec les dirigeants soviétiques à Washington et qui reflètent intégralement nos consultations.

16. Nous formulons le vœu que les problèmes inhérents au difficile processus de transition interne engagé par l'Union soviétique trouveront une solution constructive et satisfaisante pour tous ceux qui sont concernés. A cet égard, nous soutenons fermement les attentes et les aspirations des peuples baltes. Nous croyons savoir que les dirigeants de la Lituanie et de l'Union soviétique ont marqué leur volonté d'engager un dialogue sur la suspension - non sur l'annulation - par les autorités lituaniennes, de la mise en oeuvre de la déclaration d'indépendance qu'elles ont prononcée. Nous appelons toutes les parties à faire preuve de souplesse et à entamer de véritables pourparlers afin de parvenir rapidement à une solution.

17. Les activités que nous menons dans le domaine scientifique et dans celui de l'environnement - la "Troisième dimension" de l'OTAN - conservent tout leur intérêt pour les membres de l'Alliance, et sont l'expression de leur solidarité. Dans l'esprit de la Déclaration du Sommet du 40ème anniversaire, nous étudierons les mesures à prendre en vue d'inviter des experts scientifiques d'Europe centrale et orientale à participer à des travaux sur l'environnement liés aux études pilotes menées dans le cadre du Comité sur les défis de la société moderne.

18. La réunion au Sommet de mai 1989 a marqué le début d'un programme de bourses de recherche de l'OTAN sur les institutions démocratiques, dont le but

est de faciliter l'étude de nos valeurs et de nos modes de vie démocratiques par des candidats qualifiés d'Europe centrale et orientale, ainsi que des pays de l'Alliance. Nous avons l'intention de donner suite à cette initiative et nous sommes satisfaits du vif intérêt qu'elle a suscité dès la première année.

19. Conscients de la nécessité permanente de mieux informer le public sur les travaux et les objectifs de l'Alliance, nous avons apporté un ferme soutien à notre réseau d'associations et de comités nationaux qui forment l'Association du Traité atlantique. Nous croyons que ces groupes ont un rôle essentiel à jouer en faisant mieux comprendre au public le rôle de l'Alliance. Nous soulignons le grand intérêt des échanges de vues, au sein de l'Assemblée de l'Atlantique Nord, sur les problèmes auxquels l'Alliance se trouve confrontée.

20. Les évolutions dont nous sommes les témoins et dont nous avons été et continuerons d'être largement les artisans sont, nous en sommes conscients, en train de transformer en profondeur les données politiques et militaires de la sécurité européenne, et donc les conditions dans lesquelles notre Alliance est amenée à exercer son action.

Ces changements ne mettent en cause ni la nécessité de maintenir l'Alliance, ni la permanence de ses traits fondamentaux. Nous préserverons le dynamisme et la cohésion de notre Alliance, et continuerons de promouvoir une association transatlantique, solide et féconde, entre l'Amérique du Nord et une Europe toujours plus unie. Nous garderons présente à l'esprit la nécessité de la coopération et de l'assistance entre les pays membres de l'Alliance. Face au changement historique, il nous faudra continuer d'approfondir et de renforcer notre processus de consultation et, au besoin, de coordination politiques.

Aussi, tout en veillant à préserver les principes permanents qui fondent notre Alliance et en assurent l'efficacité, il nous faut aujourd'hui l'adapter aux vastes mutations en cours.

Nous avons déjà entamé ce processus, tant sur le plan politique que sur celui de la défense, comme l'ont montré les consultations ministérielles de ce printemps. A travers les négociations de maîtrise des armements auxquelles nous participons ou que nous nous préparons à ouvrir, nous nous sommes montrés prêts à ajuster le volume des forces conventionnelles et nucléaires dont disposent les Alliés. Nous avons noté que les Ministres de la défense de ceux d'entre nos pays qui participent au Groupe des plans nucléaires et au Comité des plans de défense ont décidé d'entreprendre un examen de leur stratégie. Certes, la prévention de la guerre demeurera notre tâche essentielle, mais l'évolution du contexte européen exige à présent, de notre part, une approche plus large de la sécurité, fondée tout autant sur la construction de la paix que sur son maintien.

21. Devant la mutation qui s'opère en Europe, nous reconnaissons que les changements qui affectent certains aspects des politiques et du fonctionnement de l'Alliance devront s'inscrire dans une adaptation d'ensemble de l'Organisation. Ce processus devra englober toutes les activités de l'Alliance et être mis en cohérence avec les principes dont nous avons affirmé la permanence, de même qu'avec les besoins de l'ère nouvelle dans laquelle nous entrons. Nous avons par conséquent chargé le Conseil en session permanente de

superviser les travaux en cours afin d'en assurer la coordination efficace et nous l'avons invité à nous rendre compte régulièrement de leur état d'avancement.

22. Nous tenons à exprimer notre profonde gratitude au gouvernement du Royaume-Uni pour l'accueil chaleureux qu'il nous a réservé.

CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

CD/1007
25 June 1990

Original: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 15 JUNE 1990 FROM THE PERMANENT OBSERVER OF THE
DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA ADDRESSED TO THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT TRANSMITTING
A NEW DISARMAMENT PROPOSAL ADOPTED AT THE JOINT MEETING OF THE
CENTRAL PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE, THE STANDING COMMITTEE OF THE
SUPREME PEOPLE'S ASSEMBLY AND THE ADMINISTRATION COUNCIL OF
THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA HELD IN PYONGYANG
ON 31 MAY 1990

I have the honour to transmit herewith a new disarmament proposal adopted at the joint meeting of the Central People's Committee, the Standing Committee of the Supreme People's Assembly and the Administration Council of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea held in Pyongyang on 31 May 1990.

I would be grateful if you could circulate it as an official document of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Signed) Ri Tcheul
Ambassador

A NEW DISARMAMENT PROPOSAL FOR PEACE ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA

A joint meeting of the Central People's Committee, the Standing Committee of the Supreme People's Assembly and the Administration Council of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea held in Pyongyang on 31 May discussed the question of easing the tensions on the Korean Peninsula and creating a peaceful climate for national reunification and put forward the following new disarmament proposal putting in a more concrete shape the peace package proposed in November 1988 to suit the practical conditions:

Confidence building between the North and the South

1. The North and the South should limit military training and military manoeuvres.
 - A. Any joint military manoeuvres and military training with foreign troops should be banned.
 - B. Military training and military manoeuvres of and above the divisional level should be banned.
 - C. All military manoeuvres should be banned in the area along the Military Demarcation Line (MDL).
 - D. Military manoeuvres of foreign troops should not be allowed in the territory of the North or the South.
 - E. The North and the South should notify each other in advance of military manoeuvres.
2. The North and the South should convert the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) along the MDL into a peace zone.
 - A. All the military personnel and military equipment should be withdrawn from the DMZ.
 - B. All the military set-ups in the DMZ should be dismantled.
 - C. The DMZ should be opened to civilians and be used for peaceful purposes.
3. The North and the South should take security measures to prevent an accidental conflict and its expansion.
 - A. Direct telephone links should be installed and operated between the high-level military authorities of the two sides.
 - B. All acts of military provocation against the other side should be banned in the area along the MDL.

Arms reduction in the North and the South

4. The North and the South should reduce their armed forces stage by stage.

- A. The reduction of military strength should be carried out in three phases in the period of three or four years after a disarmament agreement is reached between the two sides.

Each side should reduce its military strength to the 300,000-men level in the first stage, to the 200,000-men level in the second stage and to the level of less than 100,000-men in the third stage.

- B. Military equipment should be reduced or dismantled in proportion to the phased military reduction.
- C. All the civilian military organizations and civilian armed forces should be dissolved in the first stage of the reduction of the regular armed forces.

5. The North and the South should stop the qualitative improvement of military equipment.

- A. The introduction of new military technology and equipment and the development of military equipment should be stopped.
- B. New military technology and equipment should not be introduced from foreign countries.

6. The North and the South should inform each other of the process of disarmament and verify it.

- A. Both sides should inform each other of the process of arms reduction.
- B. The implementation of the disarmament agreement should be verified through mutual spot inspection of the other side's area.

Withdrawal of foreign forces

7. The North and the South should convert the Korean Peninsula into a nuclear-free zone.

- A. Joint efforts should be made to get all the nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea withdrawn immediately.
- B. Nuclear weapons should not be produced or purchased.
- C. Foreign planes and warships loaded with nuclear weapons should be banned from entering or passing through Korea.

8. The North and the South should make joint efforts to get all foreign troops withdrawn from the Korean Peninsula.

- A. Steps should be taken to make the United States troops and their equipment present in South Korea totally withdraw on a phased basis in keeping with the arms reduction of the North and the South.
- B. Steps should be taken to have the United States military bases in South Korea dismantled on a phased basis in keeping with the pullout of the United States troops.

Disarmament and guarantee for peace after it

9. The North and the South should take measures for disarmament and guarantee of peace after it.

- A. A neutral nations inspection force might be deployed in the DMZ along the MDL.
- B. A North-South joint military committee headed by a person at the level of the chief of general staff from each side should be formed and operated to control armament and discuss and settle possible military disputes between the North and the South.

10. The North and the South should adopt a non-aggression declaration through negotiation and reach an agreement on drastic arms reduction.

For a complete and durable peace on the Korean Peninsula, the present state of armistice must be converted into a state of peace.
